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If you are arrested for speeding, do you know which “cheek” the police are
justified in searching? In June 2013, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Fourth
Amendment permits officials to swab the inside cheek of an arrestee’s mouth
for a deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) sample if he is arrested for a serious crime.1
In April 2012, the Court held that a person detained for any reason, even for a
minor traffic offense, can be subjected to a strip search and visual inspection of
his anus or genitals if he will subsequently enter the general jail population.2
Consequently, if you are arrested today for a minor offense, such as a violation
of a leash law or a traffic infraction, the Fourth Amendment likely prohibits the
police from swabbing the inside of your mouth, but permits officials to force
you to strip, bend over, and cough to inspect your body cavities if you could later
join the general prison population.
The Court justified each holding with a different exception to the Fourth
Amendment, contradicted its own reasoning, and refused to recognize important
precedent. In Maryland v. King, the Court upheld a Maryland statute that allows
law enforcement officers to swab the cheek of an individual arrested for a serious
offense for a DNA sample, even before a neutral magistrate determines that there
is probable cause for the offense.3 In Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders
of the County of Burlington, the Court upheld a jail procedure that permits law
enforcement officers to perform a strip search and visual body cavity inspection
of an arrestee who will be held in the general prison population, even without

1. Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1980 (2013).
2. See Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 132 S. Ct. 1510, 1523 (2012).
3. King, 133 S. Ct. at 1967, 1980. However, the statute does not allow law enforcement to
process or test the DNA sample until after the arrestee appears before a magistrate. Id. at 1967.
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any reasonable suspicion that he was carrying contraband and before a neutral
magistrate determines if the offense is indictable.4
These decisions will have an enormous impact on Fourth Amendment
searches. Experts estimate that nearly one-third of Americans are arrested at
least one time by age twenty-three.5 Collection of DNA from arrestees, like the
swab of the defendant’s cheek in King, is increasingly common as DNA
technology improves.6 Currently, “cells can be collected from an individual
through a blood draw or a cheek swab,” as well as “from bodily fluids, flakes of
skin, or items such as a toothbrush, a coffee cup, or a cigarette butt.”7 Similarly,
it is not uncommon for a misdemeanor offender to be strip searched, like the
plaintiff in Florence. Law enforcement officers have strip searched individuals
after stopping them for leash law violations,8 traffic infringements,9 and
automobile inspection expirations.10 In more outrageous cases, officers strip
searched a nun for trespassing during an anti-war demonstration,11 a bicycle
rider for failing to have an audible bell,12 and a driver with an inoperable
headlight.13
This Article considers King and Florence in the context of relevant Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence. Part I of this Article explains the Fourth
Amendment, including relevant exceptions to the probable cause and warrant
requirements and the reasonableness balancing test. Part II discusses the Court’s
opinions in King and Florence. Part III exposes the Court’s inconsistent

4. Florence, 132 S. Ct. at 1514–15, 1523.
5. See, e.g., Robert Brame, Michael G. Turner, Raymond Paternoster & Shawn D. Bushway,
Cumulative Prevalence of Arrest From Ages 8 to 23 in a National Sample, 129 PEDIATRICS 21, 25
(2012).
6. See Dist. Att’y’s Office for Third Judicial Dist. v. Osbourne, 557 U.S. 52, 62 (2009)
(describing the advances in DNA technology and the resulting benefits to the criminal justice
system).
7. Brief for the Respondent at 3, Maryland v King, 133 S. Ct 1958 (2013) (No. 12-207).
8. See, e.g., Jones v. Edwards, 770 F.2d 739, 740 (8th Cir. 1985) (discussing the strip search
of a man who failed to sign a summons for a leash law violation).
9. See, e.g., Masters v. Crouch, 872 F.2d 1248, 1249–50 (6th Cir. 1989) (describing the strip
search of a woman who was arrested for failing to appear in court to address two traffic tickets);
Tinetti v. Wittke, 479 F. Supp. 486, 488 (E.D. Wis. 1979) (involving a non-misdemeanor traffic
violator who was detained because she was unable to post the required cash bail), aff’d 620 F.2d
150 (7th Cir. 1980).
10. See, e.g., Hill v. Bogans, 735 F.2d 391, 392–93 (10th Cir. 1984) (considering the
constitutionality of the strip search of a man arrested on an open warrant after he was pulled over
for an expired automobile registration sticker).
11. See, e.g., Bull v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 595 F.3d 964, 989 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc)
(Thomas, J., dissenting).
12. Brief for the Petitioner at 25, Florence, 132 S. Ct. 1510 (No. 10-945) (noting that a
plaintiff in the certified class was strip searched as a consequence of riding a bicycle without an
audible bell).
13. Id. (noting that a plaintiff in the certified class was strip searched as a consequence of
driving with an inoperable headlight).
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application of the Fourth Amendment balancing test in King and Florence, and
Part IV argues that the Court should have applied the balancing test in both cases
to protect citizens from unfettered police discretion and unreasonable searches.
Part V of the Article illustrates that this inconsistency gives law enforcement
officers greater discretion in conducting Fourth Amendment searches that is ripe
for abuse and proposes remedies by which to limit this potential for abuse. The
Article concludes that had the Court applied the appropriate balancing test
consistently, both searches would have been permissible, but only in limited
circumstances after the arrestees had appeared before a neutral magistrate.
I. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT WARRANT REQUIREMENT AND ITS EXCEPTIONS
Both King and Florence involved searches and, therefore, were appropriately
analyzed under the Fourth Amendment jurisprudence that protects individuals
from unreasonable searches and seizures. When drafting the Constitution, the
Founding Fathers were concerned with the use of “general warrants,” which
allowed any law enforcement officer to search places or people without any
evidence.14 The Fourth Amendment was written to address this concern, and it
provides that:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.15
Compliance with the Fourth Amendment usually requires a neutral magistrate
to issue a warrant individualized to the place to be searched or the persons or
things to be seized.16 The warrant requirement provides a mechanism by which
a neutral party can evaluate the basis of the search or seizure as well as a

14. See 3 JONATHAN ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 588 (2d ed. 1994) (“[G]eneral warrants, by which an
officer may search suspected places, without evidence of the commission of a fact, or seize any
person without evidence of his crime, ought to be prohibited. As these are admitted, any man may
be taken, in the most arbitrary manner, without any evidence or reason.”). See generally WILLIAM
J. CUDDIHY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: ORIGINS AND ORIGINAL MEANING 603–67 (2009)
(discussing the development of American search and seizure law from the Revolutionary War).
Many states prohibited general warrants in their own constitutions before the Fourth Amendment
was added to the U.S. Constitution. See, e.g., MD. CONST. Declaration of Rights, art. XXVI; VA.
CONST. art. I, § 10.
15. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
16. See United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1977) (holding that, in the absence of
some kind of exigency, seizure of the petitioners’ belongings entitled them “to the protection of the
Warrant Clause with the evaluation of a neutral magistrate”).
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limitation on police discretion.17 In Katz v. United States, the Court established
the general rule “that searches conducted outside the judicial process, without
prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment.”18 However, neither a warrant nor individualized suspicion of
wrongdoing is always a prerequisite to a constitutional search; rather, the
constitutionality of government action ultimately depends on whether it was
reasonable.19 Indeed, the Court has carved out several “closely guarded”20
exceptions to the Fourth Amendment probable cause and warrant requirements
by balancing the government’s legitimate interest in the search or seizure against
the individual’s privacy interest.21 The two exceptions relevant to this Article
are the search incident to a valid arrest exception and the special needs doctrine.
The search incident to a valid arrest exception applies at various stages of the
arrest.22 At the time of the arrest, searching the arrestee is reasonable to protect
the government’s interest in preventing of destruction of evidence and ensuring
the safety of the arresting officers.23 Accordingly, the police may search the
arrestee’s person as well as anything within his lunging area at the time of arrest,
without any reason to believe that he may be carrying evidence or a weapon.24
Once the arrestee is detained, he may be further searched incident to the arrest.25
For example, the police may search the arrestee’s clothing or in his wallet,26 and
any clothing seized during the search is subject to laboratory analysis.27
Additionally, the arrestee must provide handwriting samples, voice samples, or

17. Id. at 9. See generally 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT § 4.2, at 611–38 (5th ed. 2012) (discussing review of search warrants by a
detached and neutral magistrate).
18. 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
19. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19–20 (1968).
20. Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 308–09 (1997).
21. Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 109–11 (1977) (per curiam) (evaluating the
constitutionality of asking the respondent to exit his car during a traffic stop by balancing the
government’s interest in the police officer’s safety and the curtailment of the respondent’s liberty);
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762–63 (1969) (discussing the constitutionality of the search
incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement by considering the reasonableness of the
search and the intrusiveness of the size of the search area).
22. See generally, 3 LAFAVE, supra note 17, at § 5.2(b) (overviewing the search incident to
valid arrest exception).
23. Chimel, 395 U.S. at 762–63 (1969).
24. Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763; United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973) (holding
that a search incident to a valid arrest requires “no additional justification” than the probable cause
underlying the arrest).
25. United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800, 803 (1974) (“[S]earches and seizure that could
be made on the spot at the time of arrest may legally be conducted later when the accused arrives
at the place of detention.”).
26. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 549 F.3d 355, 358, 360 (6th Cir. 2008) (clothing); United
States v. Rodriguez, 995 F.2d 776 (7th Cir. 1993) (wallet).
27. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800, 804–05 (explaining that, during a search incident to valid arrest,
law enforcement officials are entitled to search, seize, and test the suspect’s clothing).
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fingerprints if he is requested to do so.28 These searches are considered to be
part of the routine administrative process of booking and detention of an arrestee
and are justified by the government’s interest in protecting the arrestee’s
property while he is detained, protecting prisoners in the jail, and verifying the
arrestee’s identity.29
The Court has also identified a “special needs” exception to justify
warrantless, suspicion-less searches in situations in which “special needs beyond
the normal need for law enforcement make the warrant and probable cause
requirement impractical.”30 For example, the Court has upheld blanket urine
drug testing of railroad employees to address the “special need” of railroad
safety.31 The Court has also held that the “special need” of school safety justifies
searches of students based on a reasonable suspicion rather than probable
cause,32 as well as blanket urine drug testing of student athletes33 and all students
who participate in extracurricular activities.34 The Court has also permitted
searches of probationers’ homes to protect the special needs associated with
monitoring offenders released from prison.35
Regardless of the exception applied, the “touchstone” of the Fourth
Amendment is the reasonableness of the government’s conduct,36 which is
evaluated by balancing the legitimate government interest protected by the
conduct against the individual’s privacy interest.37 In considering the

28. United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 14 (1973) (voice); United States v. Mara, 410 U.S.
19, 21 (1973) (handwriting); United States v. Kelly, 55 F.2d 67, 70 (2d Cir. 1932) (fingerprints);
Downs v. Swann, 73 A. 653, 654–55 (Md. 1909) (photographs).
29. See Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 239 (1960) (“We do not think it significantly
different . . . for the search of [the arrestee and his property] to occur instead at the first place of
detention when the accused arrives there, especially as the search of property carried by an accused
to the place of detention had additional justifications, similar to those which justify a search of the
person of one who is arrested.”).
30. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
31. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 620, 634 (1989). The Court also noted
that the railroad employees chose to participate in an industry “that is regulated pervasively to
ensure safety.” Id. at 627.
32. See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341.
33. See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 650, 664–65 (1995).
34. See Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 825, 838 (2002).
35. See Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 875–76, 880 (1987) (concluding that the special
needs of the probation department justify replacing the probable cause requirement with a standard
of reasonable suspicion); United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 121 (2001) (emphasizing the
government’s special need in preventing recidivism in upholding the search based only on
reasonable suspicion).
36. Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 424 U.S. 106, 108–09 (1977) (per curiam) (quoting Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968)); see also Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 652.
37. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979) (explaining that the permissibility of a
search “is judged by balancing its intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against
its promotion of legitimate governmental interests”); see also Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559
(1979); Unites States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 555 (1976); Schmerber v. California, 384

2014]

Fourth Amendment's "Cheeks" and Balances

555

government’s interest, courts examine factors such as the legitimacy of the
interest, the efficacy of the search in meeting that interest, and whether the
government used the least intrusive search methods available.38 In weighing the
individual’s privacy interest, courts look to both the individual’s expectation of
privacy and the invasiveness of the search.39 As the intrusion becomes more
invasive, the government interest must be more compelling in order to justify
the search or seizure.40
II. MARYLAND V. KING AND FLORENCE V. BOARD OF CHOSEN FREEHOLDERS
OF THE COUNTY OF BURLINGTON
Both King and Florence involved searches conducted without a warrant or
reasonable suspicion. Therefore, to be constitutional, the searches must have
been conducted pursuant to an exception to the Fourth Amendment. In King,
the Court relied on the search incident to valid arrest exception, specifically the
procedural booking exception, to justify swabbing the defendant’s cheek for a
DNA sample.41 In Florence, the Court did not identify a specific Fourth
Amendment exception, but it seemed to rely on the special needs doctrine, based
on law enforcement’s special need to thoroughly inspect each detainee to
provide proper jail security.42
In both cases, the Court attempted to limit its holding. In King, the Court
limited its holding to individuals arrested for serious offenses, but it left the
determination of which arrestees will be charged with serious crimes to law
enforcement officials.43 In Florence, the Court limited its holding to detainees
who will enter the general population of a facility, but it left the determination
of which detainees will be placed in the general population to law enforcement
officials.44
A. The Cheek Swab Case: Maryland v. King
On June 3, 2013, in an opinion written by Justice Kennedy and joined by Chief
Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Breyer, and Alito, the Court held that law

U.S. 757, 769–70 (1966). However, an important government interest does not permit
indiscriminate police behavior; the search must be reasonable in its scope and manner. Maryland
v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1978 (2013).
38. See, e.g., Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 664–65; Prouse, 440 U.S. at 658, 660–61.
39. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Earls, 536 U.S. at 822, 830 (2002); Vernonia,
515 U.S. at 654, 657–58.
40. See Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 375–77 (2009).
41. See 133 S. Ct. at 1980 (holding that DNA collection after a valid arrest is “a legitimate
police booking procedure” and therefore is reasonable).
42. See Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 132 S. Ct. 1510, 1515–23 (2012) (considering
the special need of prison safety).
43. King, 133 S. Ct. at 1980.
44. Florence, 132 S. Ct. at 1522–23.
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enforcement officials are permitted to swab the cheek of a person arrested for a
serious offense in order to collect a DNA sample.45 Petitioner Alonzo King was
arrested in April 2009 for first- and second-degree assault as a result of menacing
others with a shotgun.46 Pursuant to Maryland’s DNA Collection Act, when
King was booked, the police used a buccal cheek swab to take a sample of his
DNA.47 In July 2009, the police uploaded King’s DNA record into a state DNA
database, where it was matched to DNA evidence collected from an unsolved
2003 rape.48 This evidence supported King’s conviction for the 2003 rape.49
King moved to suppress the DNA evidence, arguing that the DNA Collection
Act permitted unreasonable searches in violation of the Fourth Amendment.50
The Court held that a buccal swab of the inner tissues of the cheek is a Fourth
Amendment search, but it determined that the search was reasonable by
balancing the minimal intrusiveness of a cheek swab against the government’s
substantial interest in identifying the arrestee and obtaining his criminal record.51
The Court relied on the routine booking exception to justify the search,
comparing the DNA cheek swab to fingerprinting and arguing that the additional
intrusion of the swab is insignificant.52 The Court analogized to United States
v. Kelly, the seminal fingerprinting case, in which the Second Circuit held that
fingerprinting is a minimal physical invasion that is “no more humiliating than
other means of identification.”53 The Court reasoned that DNA collection is
simply a better method of identification that, like fingerprinting, is part of the
routine processing of an arrestee.54 The Court made sure to note that the special
needs doctrine did not apply because a special needs search involves a lawabiding citizen, whereas King was arrested and therefore had a reduced
expectation of privacy.55
Justice Scalia, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan, wrote a
scathing dissent that accused the Court of concocting a government interest to
conceal Maryland’s obvious motive, in this case, of discovering evidence of

45. King, 133 S. Ct. at 1965, 1980.
46. Id. at 1965.
47. Id. at 1965–66. A buccal swab collects cells containing DNA from the inside of the cheek
with a sterile cotton swab, similar to a Q-tip. Id. at 1967–68.
48. Id. at 1966.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 1968–69, 1977.
52. Id. at 1976. The Court also emphasized that DNA testing is a much more accurate method
of identification. Id.
53. 55 F.2d 67, 70 (2d Cir. 1932).
54. King, 133 S. Ct. at 1976–77 (quoting Cnty. of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 58
(1991)) (explaining that “courts had no trouble determining that fingerprinting was a natural part
of ‘the administrative steps incident to arrest’”).
55. Id. at 1978.
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criminal wrongdoing.56 The dissent insisted that the government’s interest in
DNA collection “had nothing to do with establishing King’s identity.”57 Justice
Scalia distinguished fingerprinting and photographing arrestees, which are
actual means of identification and may not even be Fourth Amendment searches,
from DNA collection, which is used to solve crimes.58 Furthermore, Justice
Scalia challenged the constitutionality of fingerprinting, noting that “‘the great
expansion in fingerprinting came before the modern era of Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence,’ and so [the Court was] never asked to decide the legitimacy of
the practice.”59 Justice Scalia cautioned that, although the Court attempted to
limit its holding to individuals arrested for serious offenses, the majority’s
reasoning would eventually lead to the collection of DNA from an arrestee who
violated a traffic rule.60 Horrified by this “predictable consequence,” Justice
Scalia warned that the Court’s decision would lead to cheek swabs for DNA
collection “if you are ever arrested, rightly or wrongly, and for whatever
reason.”61
B. The Strip Search Case: Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of the
County of Burlington
One year before King, in an opinion also penned by Justice Kennedy and
joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito, the Court
held that any person arrested, rightly or wrongly, for any offense can be
subjected to a strip search and visual body cavity inspection as a condition of his
detainment in the general population of a detention facility.62 Petitioner Albert
Florence was riding in the passenger seat of his car, traveling to a family dinner,
when the driver was pulled over for a minor traffic infraction.63 After a records
search, the officer discovered an outstanding bench warrant for Florence for his
apparent failure to pay a fine for an earlier criminal charge.64 Despite Florence’s
documentation that he had paid the fine, the officer arrested Florence and
transported him to the Burlington County Jail in New Jersey, where correctional
officers required him to strip naked so they could examine his backside, under
his genitals, and in his mouth.65 After six days in the Burlington County Jail,
Florence was transported to the Essex County Correctional Facility, where he

56. Id. at 1980–82 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
57. Id. at 1984.
58. Id. at 1986–87.
59. Id. at 1988 (quoting United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 874 (9th Cir. 2004)
(Kozinski, J., dissenting)).
60. Id. at 1989.
61. Id.
62. See Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 132 S. Ct. 1510, 1514, 1523 (2012).
63. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 3, Florence, 132 S. Ct. 1510 (No. 10-945).
64. Florence, 132 S. Ct. at 1514.
65. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 63, at 3–5.
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was again strip searched.66 The Essex County officers required him to shower
with four other detainees and then to open his mouth, lift his genitals, squat, and
cough.67 In New Jersey, Florence’s alleged offense—failure to pay a fine—is a
civil offense, not a crime.68 When Florence finally appeared in front of a
magistrate six days after his arrest, the judge was “appalled” that an arrest
warrant even existed and immediately released Florence from jail.69
The Florence majority emphasized the government’s special need to provide
safe prisons and recognized the challenges of operating a prison facility.70 The
Court began its analysis by considering the application of the Fourth
Amendment balancing test to prison searches discussed in Bell v. Wolfish.71 The
Bell Court explained that, to evaluate the reasonableness of search policies in
correctional facilities, “[t]he need for a particular search must be balanced
against the resulting invasion of [the inmate’s] personal rights.”72 However,
instead of applying this balancing test, the Florence Court focused solely on the
search policy’s ability to advance the government’s interest in prison safety,73
an evaluation that “is ‘peculiarly within the province and professional expertise
of correctional officials.’”74 Accordingly, the Court held that, “unless there is
‘substantial evidence’” that the search in question is an “exaggerated” response
to safety concerns, “deference must be given to the officials in charge of the
jail.”75 Because even those arrested for minor offenses can raise safety concerns,
the Court concluded that the government has a substantial interest in stripping
and visually inspecting a detainee in the general prison population to determine
if he has a disease, is affiliated with a gang, or is attempting to smuggle
contraband.76 However, the Court explicitly declined to limit which detainees
may be placed in the general prison population, and therefore which detainees
may be subjected to a strip search.77
Justice Thomas declined to join Part IV of the opinion, in which the Court
refrained from limiting the prison administration’s discretion in choosing which
detainees will join the general population of the facility.78 Chief Justice Roberts

66. Florence, 132 S. Ct. at 1514.
67. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 63, at 6.
68. Id. at 4.
69. Id. at 7.
70. Florence, 132 S. Ct. at 1515.
71. Id. at 1516 (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979)).
72. Id.
73. See id. at 1515 (quoting Turner v. Safely, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987)) (explaining “that a
regulation impinging on an inmate’s constitutional rights must be upheld ‘if it is reasonably related
to legitimate penological interests.’”).
74. Id. at 1517 (quoting Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 584–85 (1984)).
75. Id. at 1518 (citing Block, 468 U.S. at 584–85).
76. Id. at 1520.
77. Id. at 1522–23.
78. Id. at 1513.
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wrote a concurring opinion that emphasized that there was no alternative to
holding Florence in the general population, other than releasing him altogether.79
Additionally, in a separate concurrence, Justice Alito suggested that, in some
instances, a strip search may not be reasonable, particularly if it is possible for
law enforcement officials to segregate temporary detainees from the general jail
population.80
Justice Breyer, in a dissent joined by Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and
Kagan, applied the Fourth Amendment balancing test and concluded that
invasive strip searches of detainees arrested for minor offenses are
unconstitutional in the absence of a reasonable suspicion that the detainees were
carrying drugs or other contraband.81 Justice Breyer admonished the majority
for failing to define “any clear example of an instance in which contraband was
smuggled into the general jail population during intake that could not have been
discovered if the jail was employing a reasonable suspicion standard.”82 He
further accused the Court of relying too heavily on the prison officials’
representations, which he considered insufficient to justify the searches.83

79. Id. at 1523 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
80. Id. at 1524–25 (Alito, J., concurring).
81. Id. at 1524–25 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer supported his conclusion by noting
that several circuit courts of appeals applied the balancing test in prison search cases and reached
the same result. Id. at 1530 (“[A]t least seven Courts of Appeals . . . have required reasonable
suspicion that an arrestee is concealing weapons or contraband before a strop search of one arrested
for a minor offense can take place.”). For example, the Fifth Circuit held that a search policy that
permitted strip searches of all individuals arrested for misdemeanors—punishable only by
fine—without a reasonable suspicion was unconstitutional. Steward v. Lubbock Cnty., 767 F.2d
153, 156–57 (5th Cir. 1985) (involving an arrest for public intoxication and for issuing a bad check
after a routine traffic stop). Similarly, the First Circuit concluded that a strip search policy was
unconstitutional under Bell, holding that “[a]n indiscriminate strip search policy routinely applied
to detainees . . . cannot be constitutionally justified simply on the basis of administrative ease in
attending to security considerations.” Logan v. Shealy, 660 F.2d 1007, 1013 (1st Cir. 1981).
Additionally, the Ninth Circuit held that an individual arrested for a minor offense could only be
strip searched if officials have a “reasonable suspicion that the arrestee is carrying or concealing
contraband or suffering from a communicable disease.” Giles v. Ackerman, 746 F.2d 614, 615 (9th
Cir. 1984) (identifying the “nature of the offense, the arrestee’s appearance and conduct, and [his]
prior arrest record” as factors to consider in whether there is reasonable suspicion to search a
detainee). However, other circuit courts have agreed with the Florence majority and have deferred
to prison officials in determining whether to strip search detainees. See, e.g., Bull v. City & Cnty.
of S.F., 595 F.3d 964, 975 (9th Cir. 2010) (deferring to the correctional facility and upholding the
strip search policy in question); Powell v. Barrett, 541 F.3d 1298, 1307 (11th Cir. 2008) (holding
that Bell does not require reasonable suspicion to conduct a strip search), cert. denied sub nom.
Matkin v. Barrett, 134 S. Ct. 513 (2013).
82. Florence, 132 S. Ct. at 1530 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
83. Id. at 1531.

560

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 63:549

III. THE SUPREME COURT’S INCONSISTENT APPLICATION OF THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT
In King, the Court justified the warrantless collection of the petitioner’s DNA
with the search incident to valid arrest exception—specifically the
administrative booking exception—to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant
requirement.84 The Court specifically declined to consider the special needs
doctrine because a special needs search involves a law-abiding citizen, not an
arrestee suspected of wrongdoing.85 However, in Florence, the Court upheld the
strip searches with the special needs doctrine, even though the petitioner in
Florence had been arrested, just like the petitioner in King.86
Both opinions relied on the Fourth Amendment balancing test to uphold the
searches. In King, the Court balanced the government’s interest in identifying
arrestees and the effectiveness of the DNA analysis against the minimal
intrusion of a cheek swab and the limited use of the DNA information. However,
in Florence, although the Court considered the application of the balancing test
in Bell, it ultimately deferred to the judgment of the prison officials, failing to
evaluate the effectiveness of the search policy and refusing to recognize the
intrusiveness of a strip search.
A. The Government’s Interest
The Fourth Amendment required the King and Florence Courts to balance the
petitioners’ privacy interests against the government’s interest in each search.
In evaluating the government’s interests, the Court considers whether (1) the
interest is legitimate; (2) the search was effective in meeting that interest; and
(3) the police used the least intrusive search means available.87
1. Legitimate Interest
Both King and Florence relied on the safety of the prison and detainee
population to justify their respective searches.88 In King, the Court identified
“the need for law enforcement officers in a safe and accurate way to process and
identify the persons and possessions they must take into custody” as a legitimate
government interest.89 The King opinion proffered two purposes for identifying
the arrestee: (1) to determine his identity, including his name and social security
number; and (2) to determine whether he had previously been charged with or

84. King, 133 S. Ct. at 1970–71.
85. Id.. at 1978.
86. Florence, 132 S. Ct. at 1515–23.
87. See, e.g., Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 650, 664–65 (1995); Delaware
v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 658, 660–61 (1979).
88. Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1970; Florence, 566 U.S. at 1518, 1520.
89. King, 133 S. Ct. at 1970–72. Justice Scalia dismissed the majority’s justification, arguing
that the actual purpose of collecting the DNA sample was to solve crimes. Id. at 1980, 1982
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
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convicted of other crimes.90 The Court explained that, by collecting DNA, the
police can determine the “type of person whom they are detaining,” which
assists them in making critical decisions regarding arrest and detainment.91 The
Court highlighted the specific safety benefits of identifying gang membership,
explaining that the ability to review an arrestee’s criminal record achieves the
same result as examining the arrestee himself for evidence of gang
membership.92 This type of identification allows law enforcement officials to
later protect other prisoners and prison staff who may come into contact with the
arrestee, without creating inordinate “‘risks for facility staff, for the existing
detainee population, and for a new detainee.’”93
The Florence Court also justified the search at issue with the government’s
substantial interest in prison safety. The Court placed significant weight on the
prison officials’ need to conduct “a thorough search as a standard part of the
intake process,” citing the numerous risks that the intake of arrestees creates for
staff, the detainee population, and the new detainee himself.94 However, unlike
in King, the Court did not rely on the administrative booking exception to justify
the government’s interest. Instead, the Court identified the special need of
prison safety as a legitimate government interest and determined that the strip
searches were necessary to detect injuries, lice, and contagious diseases to
identify gang membership through tattoos and other markings in order to isolate
and prevent potential gang violence, and to discover contraband.95
Additionally, both opinions relied on Bell, which permitted cavity searches of
inmates who had contact visits, to emphasize the importance of the
government’s interests in the searches.96 In King, the Court cited Bell for the
proposition that the government has a substantial interest in bringing those
accused of crimes to trial.97 In Florence, the Court cited Bell for the proposition
that search policies designed to prevent contraband from entering prisons serve
the legitimate government interest of ensuring prison safety and that courts
should defer to law enforcement in promulgating these policies.98
Finally, the King Court also recognized that the DNA identification of
arrestees also advances the government’s substantial interest in protecting the
general public. The Court explained that the ability to examine the arrestee’s

90. Id. at 1971.
91. Id. at 1972.
92. Id. at 1972–73. The Court explained that DNA identification is no different than
“matching tattoos to known gang symbols to reveal a criminal affiliation.” Id.
93. Id. at 9172 (quoting Florence, 132 S. Ct. at 1518).
94. Florence, 132 S. Ct. at 1518.
95. See id. at 1518–19, 1523.
96. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 558–59 (1979).
97. King, 133 S. Ct. at 1972–73 (quoting Bell, 441 U.S. at 534, 557).
98. Florence, 132 S. Ct. at 1516–17 (citing Bell, 441 U.S. at 546, 559).
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criminal record assists a court in determining whether the arrestee should be
released on bail or whether his bail should be revoked.99
Thus, both opinions reflected a legitimate government interest in the searches
in question. In King, the Court upheld the search to advance the government’s
substantial interest in identifying the arrestee and his past conduct, which serves
to both ensure prison safety and protect the general public. Florence similarly
rested on safety concerns, validating the government’s interest in regulating
prison safety.
2. Efficacy
To satisfy the reasonableness test, the search must also be effective in
advancing the government’s interest.100 While King successfully met this
requirement by substantiating the effectiveness of DNA testing, the Florence
Court deferred to the judgment of the prison officials, failing to reach a
conclusion about the effectiveness of strip searches in ensuring prison safety.
The King Court explicitly discussed the effectiveness and accuracy of DNA
testing.101 DNA testing is a much more advanced identification technique. It is
more accurate than both fingerprints and photographs at identifying arrestees, as
it is capable of identifying an arrestee even if he has attempted to change his
physical characteristics to avoid identification.102 DNA also has the ability to
discern guilt or innocence, helping to both convict the guilty and exonerate the
wrongfully convicted.103 Although the Court acknowledged that the amount of
time the testing of a DNA sample takes may cause considerable delay, the
majority presumed that the speed of DNA testing will improve—mirroring
advancements in fingerprinting—to the extent that it will be even more effective
in the future.104 Additionally, DNA testing provides information that is essential
in determining whether an arrestee should be released on bail.105 The Court cited
several studies of cases in which DNA identification would have uncovered the
arrestees’ criminal records and prevented their release and subsequent

99. King, 133 S. Ct. at 1973 (quoting Md. R. § 4-216(f)(1)(G) (2013)) (“Knowing that the
defendant is wanted for a previous violent crime based on DNA identification is especially
probative of the court’s consideration of ‘the danger of the defendant to the alleged victim, another
person, or the community.’”).
100. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 837 (2002);
Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 660 (1995).
101. King, 133 S. Ct. at 1975–76.
102. Id. at 1976.
103. Id. at 1966, 1974 (quoting Dist. Att’y’s Office for Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 557
U.S. 52, 55 (2009)) (noting that “courts have acknowledged DNA testing’s ‘unparalleled ability
both to exonerate the wrongly convicted and to identify the guilty’” and that the identification of
one arrestee as the perpetrator of a previous violent crime could also have the “salutary effect of
freeing a person wrongfully imprisoned for the same offense”).
104. Id. at 1976–77.
105. Id. at 1973–74.
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commission of additional crimes.106 Similarly, DNA identification provides
information necessary to revoke bail for offenders released without knowledge
of their violent criminal history.107
Conversely, rather than engage in an analysis of the efficacy of strip searches
in protecting prisoners and prison staff, the Florence Court deferred to the
correctional officials’ determination that such searches are necessary. The Court
concluded that, absent “substantial evidence” that the search policy is
unwarranted, the policy is justified by the “expert judgment” of its creators.108
The Court attempted to justify the strip searching of those arrested for minor
offenses by speculating that those individuals “can turn out to be the most
devious and dangerous criminals” and are equally as likely as serious offenders
to attempt to smuggle contraband into jail.109
Thus, the King Court established that DNA testing effectively advances the
government’s safety interest by citing its ability to identify the arrestee and his
past criminal behavior, while the Florence Court concluded that strip searches
keep prisons safe because prison officials argued that they do.
3. Least Intrusive Means
In assessing the government’s conduct, courts also consider whether there was
a less intrusive way to administer the search to accomplish the government’s
goal.110 The Court did not address whether the government used the least
intrusive means in either King or Florence.
B. The Individual’s Privacy Interest
To determine the extent of an individual’s privacy interest, the Court
considers both (1) the individual’s legitimate expectation of privacy, and (2) the

106. King, 133 S. Ct. at 1973 (citing City of Chicago, Chicago’s Study on Preventable Crimes,
DNA SAVES, http://www.dnasaves.org/files/ChicagoPreventableCrimes.pdf (last visited Apr. 9,
2014); Denver Dist. Att’y’s Office, Denver’s Study on Preventable Crimes, DENVER DA,
http://www.denverda.org/DNA_Documents/Denver%27s%20Preventable%20Crimes%20Study.p
df (last visited Apr. 9, 2014); Md. Criminal Justice Info. Sys., Maryland Study on Preventable
Crimes, http://www.denverda.org/DNA_Documents/MarylandDNAarresteestudy.pdf (last visited
Apr. 9, 2014)).
107. King, 133 S. Ct. at 1974 (providing examples of bail and diversion determinations that
courts reversed after DNA evidence identified the arrestee’s violent history).
108. Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 132 S. Ct. 1510, 1517–18 (quoting Block v.
Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 584–85 (1984)) (“The task of determining whether a policy is reasonably
related to legitimate security interests is ‘peculiarly within the province and professional expertise
of corrections officials’” . . . [and] ‘in the absence of substantial evidence in the record to indicate
that the officials have exaggerated their response to these considerations courts should ordinarily
defer to their expert judgment in such matters.’”).
109. Id. at 1520–21.
110. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 837 (2002);
Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 658–60 (1995); Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’
Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 626 (1989).
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invasiveness of the search.111 The Court considered both factors in King, but did
not discuss the petitioner’s privacy interest in Florence.
1. Legitimate Expectation of Privacy
For the Fourth Amendment to protect King and Florence, each must “have
exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy . . . that society is
prepared to recognize as reasonable.”112 This expectation is not static; there is a
“continuum” of privacy expectations.113 An individual has the greatest
expectation of privacy in his home114 and in his body.115 That expectation
diminishes on a public street116 and in an automobile.117
A lawful arrest “changes the nature of [an individual’s] physical relationship
to the State, and correspondingly diminishes the individual’s reasonable
expectation of privacy.”118 Accordingly, King’s and Florence’s expectations of
privacy were reduced when they were arrested, and further diminished when
they were detained at the police station. However, King’s and Florence’s
expectations of privacy differed because of the seriousness of their alleged
offenses. King, arrested for a serious offense involving a weapon, arguably had
a lesser expectation of privacy than Florence, who was arrested for a minor
violation that did not required jail time.
The Fourth Amendment also describes a judicial finding of probable cause a
“watershed event” that officially distinguishes a detainee from a member of the
general public.119 After a probable cause hearing, the court may curtail a
defendant’s liberty by placing him in jail or ordering strict conditions of pre-trial
release, such as electronic monitoring, mandatory drug testing, curfew

111. See King, 133 S. Ct. at 1979 (citing Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 330 (2001)).
112. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
113. See Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 850 (2006).
114. See Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1414 (2013) (quoting Silverman v. United States,
365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961)) (stating that a person’s right to be free from unreasonable searches of
his home is at the “core” of the Fourth Amendment).
115. Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1558 (2013) (explaining that physical intrusions
into the human body “implicate[] an individual’s ‘most personal and deep-rooted expectation of
privacy’”) (quoting Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 760 (1985)).
116. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22–24, 27 (1968) (balancing the government’s interests in
crime detection and officer safety against the individual’s privacy interest and holding that a search
for weapons in an individual’s outer garments need only be based on a reasonable suspicion that
the individual is armed and dangerous).
117. See California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 392–93 (1985) (recognizing that there is a lesser
expectation of privacy in an automobile).
118. Brief of Petitioner at 17, Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958 (2013) (No. 12-207) (citing
United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973)); see also Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 557
(1979) (indicating that a detainee’s right to privacy is “of a diminished scope”).
119. United States v. Pool, 621 F.3d 1213, 1219 (9th Cir. 2010).
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requirements, and travel restrictions.120 Neither King nor Florence appeared in
front of a magistrate before being searched.
A criminal conviction further reduces an individual’s expectation of privacy.
A conviction is a “transformative” event.121 Although “there is no iron curtain
drawn between the Constitution and the prisons of this country,”122 incarcerated
individuals “have a severely reduced expectation of privacy.”123 Similarly,
parolees and probationers are considered convicted felons who remain under the
supervision of the state and therefore continue to have a very reduced
expectation of privacy.124 However, even individuals who have been convicted
and incarcerated “retain the essence of human dignity inherent in all persons.”125
Neither King nor Florence had been convicted before being searched.
Accordingly, the presumption of innocence to which all arrestees are entitled
afforded King and Florence greater expectations of privacy than convicted
felons.126
LEGITIMATE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY SPECTRUM

Alonzo King and Albert Florence retained similar expectations of privacy;
both were arrested, detained, and searched before a neutral magistrate found
probable cause. However, Florence had a greater expectation of privacy because
his alleged offense was a mere civil infraction, whereas King was charged with

120. See id. at 1216–17.
121. See United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 834 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc).
122. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555–56 (1974).
123. Maryland v. Raines, 857 A.2d 19, 33 (Md. 2004) (plurality opinion); see also Hudson v.
Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 530 (1984) (“[P]risoners have no legitimate expectation of privacy.”); Brief
of Petitioner, supra note 118, at 16–17 (citing Samson v. California, 574 U.S. 843, 850 (2006))
(noting that incarceration “implicitly mark[s] the nadir of privacy expectations”). However, a
prisoner does not shed his Constitutional rights. Turner v. Safely, 482 U.S. 78, 84 (1987); Bell v.
Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 545 (1979).
124. See United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 120–21 (2001) (holding that reducing
recidivism is a legitimate government interest justifying the search of a probationer’s home based
on only a reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing); Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 874–75 (1987)
(explaining that probation falls on a continuum of punishments between incarceration and full
freedom).
125. Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1928 (2011).
126. King v. State, 42 A.3d 549, 577 (Md. 2012) (“Although arrestees do not have all the
expectations of privacy enjoyed by the general public, the presumption of innocence bestows on
them greater protections than convicted felons, parolees, or probationers.”), rev’d, 133 S. Ct. 1958
(2013).
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a first-degree assault, a serious crime that carries a sentence of up to twenty-five
years in prison.127
The King Court recognized this privacy spectrum. The Court based its ruling,
in part, on the fact that King was arrested for a serious crime.128 The Court
recognized that, while not every search is acceptable simply because a person is
in custody, once a person has been lawfully arrested for a serious offense that
could require pretrial detention, “his or her expectations of privacy and freedom
from police scrutiny are reduced.”129
Conversely, in Florence, the Court refused to acknowledge any distinction
between the expectation of privacy of an individual arrested for a serious crime
and an individual arrested for a minor crime. Because the government has the
authority to arrest individuals suspected of minor crimes that do not mandate jail
time, suspects of minor crimes can be detained alongside serious offenders.130
Consequently, the Court rejected Florence’s argument that strip searches should
only be performed on detainees arrested for serious crimes because correctional
officers cannot easily determine which detainees qualify as serious offenders.131
The Court explained that law enforcement officers cannot predict which
offenders may pose safety concerns based only on the seriousness of the offenses
for which they were arrested.132 Additionally, a detainee may lie about his
identity or his criminal history may be unavailable, inaccurate, or incomplete.133
In these circumstances, law enforcement officials are ill equipped to evaluate the
seriousness of the detainee’s offense, which requires a case-by-case
determination.134 Accordingly, the Court declined to place any restrictions on
who can be held in the general population of a detainment facility—and
therefore who can be strip searched—essentially granting the officials the power
to determine the amount of privacy to which an arrestee is entitled.

127. See MD. CODE. ANN., CRIM. LAW § 3-202(b) (LexisNexis 2012).
128. See King, 133 S. Ct. at 1977–78 (“The necessary predicate of a valid arrest for a serious
offense is fundamental.”). The Maryland statute at issue authorized law enforcement officials to
collect DNA from an individual “charged with: 1. a crime of violence or an attempt to commit a
crime of violence; or 2. burglary or an attempt to commit burglary.” MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAF.,
§ 2-504(a)(3)(i) (LexisNexis 2011 & Supp. 2013).
129. King, 133 S. Ct. at 1978.
130. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 347 (2001) (permitting the arrest of a woman
for failing to wear seat belt, even though the offense did not carry jail time).
131. Florence, 132 S. Ct. at 1520. The Court reasoned that it would be “difficult in practice to
determine whether individual detainees” fall into the category of being arrested for serious crimes.
Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 1521.
134. Id. at 1522 (citing Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 761-62 (1984) (White, J.,
dissenting)); Bull v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 595 F.3d 964, 985–87 (9th Cir. 2010) (Kozinski, C.J.,
concurring)).
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2. Intrusiveness of the Search
Both King and Florence involved Fourth Amendment searches. However, the
difference in the intrusiveness of each search is stark; King merely had to open
his mouth, while Florence was forced to expose his mouth, anus, and genitals.
These searches fall on a continuum of intrusiveness that is similar to the
legitimate expectation of privacy spectrum. Some searches are not invasive
enough to even implicate the Fourth Amendment because they do not involve
physical intrusions.135 For example, taking an individual’s photograph does not
implicate the Fourth Amendment because it does not invade a legitimate
expectation of privacy.136 At the other end of the spectrum, searches are most
intrusive if they pose a threat to the health or safety of the arrestee.137
The pat down of an individual’s outer garments, although considered a Fourth
Amendment search, is minimally intrusive.138 Outer body searches, such as the
collection of fingernail scrapings139 and hair samples 140 and breathalyzer
tests,141 are somewhat more intrusive than a pat down search. Blood and urine
samples and cheek swabs are even more intrusive, but the Court has concluded
that these intrusions are not significant.142 However, a strip search is a serious
invasion of privacy that is “‘demeaning, dehumanizing, undignified,
humiliating, terrifying, unpleasant, embarrassing, [and] repulsive, signifying

135. See Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct 1409, 1414 (2013) (quoting United States v. Jones, 132
S. Ct. 945, 950 n.3 (2012)) (noting that the “baseline” for determining whether a Fourth
Amendment search occurred is whether there was a physical intrusion into a constitutionally
protected area).
136. Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1986 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
137. See Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 761 (1985) (“A crucial factor in analyzing the
magnitude of the intrusion . . . is the extent to which the procedure may threaten the safety or health
of the individual.”).
138. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 29–30 (1968).
139. Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 295 (1973) (quoting id. at 24–25) (“[T]he search of the
respondent’s fingernails . . . constituted the type of ‘severe, though brief, intrusion upon cherished
personal security’ that is subject to constitutional scrutiny.”).
140. See id.
141. See Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n., 489 U.S. 602, 616–17 (1989) (comparing a
breathalyzer test to a blood test).
142. See Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1979 (2013) (buccal swabs); Missouri v.
McNeely, 133 S. Ct 1552, 1558 (2013) (blood draws); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757,
771–72 (1966) (same); Skinner, 489 U.S. at 626–27 (urine samples).
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degradation and submission.’”143 A body cavity inspection is a further intrusion
and is the type of search that gives the Court the “most pause.”144
INTRUSIVENESS SPECTRUM

A cheek swab is one of the lesser intrusive searches on the spectrum. The rub
against the inside part of the cheek does not break the skin and “‘involves
virtually no risk, trauma, or pain.’”145 The King Court found that a “crucial”
factor in evaluating the level of intrusion was that the swab posed no threat to
the safety or health of the detainee and “did not increase the indignity already
attendant to normal incidents of arrest.”146 Additionally, the Maryland statute
limits the use of the DNA that the swab collects. The statute lists only five
purposes for which the DNA can be tested, and it explicitly states that only DNA
samples related to identification may be collected and tested.147 The swab in
King was reasonable because it was only collected and tested for the purposes
of identifying the petitioner.148

143. Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 132 S. Ct. 1510, 1526 (2012) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Mary Beth G. v. City of Chicago, 723 F.2d 1263, 1272 (7th Cir. 1984)); see
also Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 375–76 (2009) (holding that a strip
search of a student—forcing her to undress down to her underwear and bra—was not justified,
despite the school’s valid interest in eliminating drugs from the school, because of the “extreme
intrusiveness of a search down to the body,” especially in a situation in which there was no reason
to suspect that the student had hidden contraband in her underwear).
144. Bell v. Wolfish at 558, 560 (“We do not underestimate the degree to which these searches
may invade the personal privacy of inmates.”); see also Byrd v. Maricopa Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t,
629 F.3d 1135, 1136 n.1 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (quoting Way v. Cnty. of Ventura, 445 F.3d
1157, 1160 (9th Cir. 2006)) (acknowledging the “humiliation and degradation associated with
forcibly exposing one’s nude body to strangers”); Wood v. Clemons, 89 F.3d 922, 928 (1st Cir.
1996) (quoting Conchrane v. Quattrocchi, 949 F.2d 11, 13 (1st Cir. 1991)) (“[A] strip search, by its
very nature, constitutes an extreme intrusion upon personal privacy, as well as an offense to the
dignity of the individual”); Blackburn v. Snow, 771 F.2d 556, 564 (1st Cir. 1985) (recognizing
“‘the severe if not gross interference with a person’s privacy’ that accompanies a visual body cavity
search”) (quoting Arruda v. Fair, 710 F.2d 886, 887 (1st Cir. 1983)).
145. See King, 133 S. Ct. at 1979 (quoting Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 771).
146. Id. at 1963 (quoting Winston v. Lee 470 U.S. 753, 761 (1985)).
147. MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAF. § 2-505 (LexisNexis 2011).
148. King, 133 S. Ct. 1979. The Court supported its opinion by citing similar limitations on
student drug testing in cases in which urine samples could only be used to test for drugs, not for
epilepsy, pregnancy, or diabetes. Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 644, 658 (1955).
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In Florence, the Court failed to address the intrusiveness of the search at all,
and it even refused to label the search as a “strip search.”149 Although the Court
conceded that Florence was forced to remove his clothes and “allege[dly]” lift
his genitals and cough in a squatting position, it emphasized that Florence was
never physically touched.150
IV. WHAT THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD HAVE DONE
In performing the balancing test, the Court should have applied a sliding scale:
as the search becomes more intrusive, the government needs to have a more
compelling legitimate interest.151 Because a strip search and visual body cavity
inspection is more intrusive than a cheek swab, the Florence search should have
required greater justification by the government than the cheek swab in King.
However, the Court limited the less intrusive cheek swab search to those charged
with serious crimes, but permitted the more intrusive strip and visual body cavity
search of anyone who will be detained in the general jail population, including
those arrested for minor offenses. Had the Court performed the balancing test
in both cases, both holdings would have been limited and the result in Florence
would have been different.
Additionally, both King and Florence were pretrial detainees who were
searched prior to appearing before a magistrate. Therefore, both cases should
have been examined under the administrative booking exception to the Fourth
Amendment warrant and probable cause requirements. However, regardless of
the exception used to justify the search, the Court should have performed the
balancing test in Florence in the same way it did in King.
Although the King Court was “reluctant to circumscribe the authority of the
police,” it still applied the balancing test as required by the Fourth
Amendment.152 The Court concluded that King had a minimal privacy interest
because he was arrested for a serious crime involving a weapon and the cheek
swab was minimally intrusive.153 On the other hand, the government had a
legitimate interest in identifying King to protect both the other prisoners and the
general public and the swab was an effective means by which to advance that
interest.154
In Florence, the Court did not apply the reasonableness balancing test. Instead
of discussing the twenty-five years of circuit cases that applied the balancing test
to find that some sort of suspicion was required before permitting strip and body

149. See Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 132 S. Ct. 1510, 1513, 1515 (2012) (referring
to the search as “a close visual inspection while undressed” and describing the term “strip search”
as imprecise).
150. Id. at 1514–15.
151. See Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1. v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 375–77 (2009).
152. King, 133 S. Ct. at 1970, 1970, 1974.
153. See id. at 1977–79.
154. See id. at 1970–73, 1976–77.

570

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 63:549

cavity searches,155 the Court only referenced the Third Circuit Court of Appeals
decision below, which found the search to be constitutional, and the other
circuits that came to the same conclusion.156
Had the Court performed the balancing test, it would have found that, although
the government’s need to ensure prison security is legitimate, the strip searching
of minor offenders is not the most effective or least intrusive means by which to
achieve that goal. In his dissent, Justice Breyer discussed the circuit court cases
that applied the balancing test and subsequently concluded that the government
failed to prove that requiring a reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing resulted in
an increase in detainees smuggling contraband into prisons.157 Justice Breyer
recognized that “managing a jail or prison is an ‘inordinately difficult
undertaking’” and that regulations that infringe on constitutional interests are
typically upheld “as long as they are ‘reasonably related to legitimate
penological interests.’”158 However, he cautioned that “the need must not be
‘exaggerated’” and accused the Court of relying too heavily on the
representations of the prison officials.159 In both cases, the Court should have
balanced the government’s interest in the search against the petitioners’ privacy
interests.

155. See, e.g., Masters v. Crouch, 872 F.2d 1248, 1257 (6th Cir. 1989) (requiring reasonable
grounds to believe that a detainee arrested for a traffic or non-violent offense is carrying contraband
before he can be strip searched); Weber v. Dell, 804 F.2d 796, 804 (2d Cir. 1986) (requiring
reasonable suspicion to strip search a minor offender); Jones v. Edwards, 770 F.2d 739, 741–42
(8th Cir. 1985) (concluding that the strip search of an individual arrested for violating a leash law
was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment); Stewart v. Lubbock Cnty., 767 F.2d 153, 154
(5th Cir. 1985) (holding that strip searching of minor offenders is unconstitutional without
reasonable suspicion); Hill v. Bogans, 735 F.2d 391, 394 (10th Cir. 1984) (finding no justification
for the strip search of an individual for an overdue speeding ticket and violation of a license
restriction); Mary Beth G. v. City of Chicago, 723 F.2d 1263, 1274 (7th Cir. 1983) (holding that
the strip search of a minor offender awaiting a bail determination was unconstitutional); Logan v.
Shealy, 660 F.2d 1007, 1013 (4th Cir. 1981) (holding that a blanket strip search policy is
unconstitutional). But see Bull v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 595 F.3d 964, 982 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc)
(permitting strip searches that satisfy the Fourth Amendment balancing test); Powell v. Barrett, 541
F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (upholding a strip search policy that did not require reasonable
suspicion), aff’d sub nom. Powell v. Sheriff, 511 F. App’x 957 (11th Cir. 2013), cert. denied sub
nom. Matkin v. Barrett, 134 S. Ct. 513 (2013).
156. Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 132 S. Ct. 1510, 1518 (2012) (citing Bame v.
Dillard, 637 F.3d 380, 382 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders, 621 F.3d
296, 311 (3d Cir. 2010); Bull v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 595 F.3d 964, 966 (9th Cir. 2010); Powell v.
Barrett, 541 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2008), cert. denied sub nom. Matkin v. Barrett, 134 S. Ct. 513
(2013)).
157. Florence, 132 S. Ct. at 1530 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
158. Id. at 1527–28 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Turner v. Safely, 482 U.S. 78, 85, 89
(1987)).
159. Id. at 1531 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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A. Government Interest
Both opinions identified a legitimate government interest. However, although
the Court sufficiently addressed the efficacy of the search in King, it did not
require the government to prove the efficacy of strip searching minor offenders
in Florence. In both cases, the Court should have evaluated the efficacy of the
government’s conduct and whether that conduct was the least intrusive as
possible.
1. Legitimate Interest
Both King and Florence relied on a similar legitimate government interest:
prison safety. In King, the Court held that the government has a legitimate
interest in identifying both the detainee and his criminal history. A detainee’s
criminal record serves to promote safety, even if it also implicates the detainee
in another crime. In his dissent, Justice Scalia accused the majority of
concocting a government interest and argued that the true purpose of the DNA
swab was to discover evidence of criminal wrongdoing.160 However, the Court
was correct to conclude that identification is a legitimate government interest.
Although the search incident to valid arrest exception was carved out to protect
individuals around the arrestee, this type of search often leads to additional
inculpatory evidence as well. Furthermore, several state courts have already
used the government interest in identification to justify DNA collection from
arrestees and convicted felons.161 Similarly, the Florence Court correctly
concluded that the government has a legitimate interest in prison safety; even
the dissent agreed that the government’s interest is legitimate.162
2. Efficacy
The King Court adequately discussed the efficacy of the cheek swab in
advancing the government’s interest. The Court concluded that, based on
studies, statistics, and information about the DNA technology, the government’s
interest in identification “is not speculative;” indeed, DNA offers “irrefutable
evidence” of identity that helps to isolate violent offenders.163 On the other hand,

160. See Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1982–85 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The truth,
known to Maryland and increasingly to the reader: this search had nothing to do with establishing
King’s identity.”).
161. See, e.g., Mario v. Kaipio, 265 P.3d 389, 392 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2011) (requiring a DNA
sample as a condition of release), vacated, 281 P.2d 476 (Ariz. 2012), abrogated by King, 133 S.
Ct. 1958; Poston v. State, 201 S.W.3d 406, 413 (Ark. 2005) (noting that collecting a DNA sample
from a convicted felon was a reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment); State v. Hutchinson,
969 A.2d 923, 931–32 (Me. 2009) (noting the government’s interest in identifying monitoring
convicted felons through DNA samples); State v. Sanders, 163 P.3d 607 (Ore. 2007) (comparing
DNA samples to fingerprints and photographs).
162. Florence, 132 S. Ct. at 1527–28 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
163. King, 133 S. Ct. at 1972–74.
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the efficacy of strip searching detainees arrested for minor offenses in Florence
remains speculative, and the Court deferred to the prison officials’ argument that
such searches are effective in maintaining prison safety.164
Although the Court distinguished minor offenders from serious offenders in
King, it was unwilling to do so in Florence. However, this distinction is
important in determining efficacy. First, minor offenders, typically stopped
unexpectedly, do not have the time or wherewithal to surreptitiously and
spontaneously store contraband in their body cavities.165 In Florence, in order
for the efficacy argument to be logical, the Court would have to assume that
Florence strapped contraband under his genitals or secreted them in his anal
cavity before attending a family celebration, in anticipation that the police would
stop his wife for a traffic violation and then arrest and detain him for failing to
pay a fine. The Court rejected this flawed logic in an earlier case, in which it
concluded that a full car search for evidence or contraband following a traffic
citation would not be effective because the likelihood that an officer would
“stumble onto evidence wholly unrelated to the speeding offense seems
remote.”166
Second, the government provided limited support for the argument that minor
offenders were at risk for smuggling contraband.167 Justice Breyer found no
convincing evidence that mandatory strip searches of minor offenders without
reasonable suspicion furthered the government’s safety goals.168 Additionally,
he admonished the Court for failing to provide any examples of cases in which
detainees smuggled contraband into a jail that would not have been discovered
if the jail employed a reasonable suspicion standard for searches.169 Justice
Breyer instead relied on two studies suggesting that requiring reasonable
suspicion for strip searches would not result in contraband passing into jails
undetected.170 He noted that many correction facilities, including the United
States Marshals Service and the Federal Bureau of Prisons, require reasonable
suspicion before strip searching detainees that will be held in the general jail

164. See Florence, 132 S. Ct. at 1517–21.
165. Florence, 132 S. Ct. at 1531 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
166. Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 118 (1998); see also Robin Lee Fenton, Comment, The
Constitutionality of Policies Requiring Strip Searches of All Misdemeanants and Minor Traffic
Offenders, 54 U. CIN. L. REV. 175, 185–86 (1985) (“[O]ne who is arrested for an outstanding
parking ticket is much less likely to be carrying a dangerous weapon than is one who is arrested for
an armed robbery.”).
167. See Florence, 132 S. Ct. at 1520–21. Instead, the Petitioner provided evidence that most
smuggling is facilitated by jail employees, not detainees. See Brief for the Petitioner, supra note
12, at 31 n.10.
168. Florence, 132 S. Ct. at 1528 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
169. Id. at 1529–30 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
170. Id. at 1528–29 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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population.171 Justice Breyer also listed several states that prohibit suspicionless
searches of minor—or, in some cases, all—offenders.172
Third, for twenty-five years before Florence, federal courts of appeals had
consistently held that strip searching minor offenders without reasonable
suspicion that they were carrying contraband was unreasonable.173 Although jail
officials worried that these rulings “would result in major security problems
because of the dramatic increase in contraband entering the jail,” a study
commissioned by the United States Department of Justice indicated that the
jurisdictions that required reasonable suspicion before strip searching detainees
did not see an increase in the smuggling of contraband into prisons once blanket
suspicionless searches were prohibited.174
For example, the United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York reported that, of 23,000 arrestees processed in the Orange County
Correctional Facility, only one would have been able to smuggle in contraband
past a reasonable suspicion standard.175 Another New York study reported that,
of the 75,000 new prisoners strip searched at the Nassau County Correctional
Center from 1993 to 1998, not one case required a strip search “without
colorable suspicion . . . to uncover a weapon or other contraband from a body or
body cavity.”176 Similarly, in 2009, a federal district court judge in northern
Illinois found that jail officials could not show that minor offenders entering the
Cook County, Illinois jail “routinely possessed contraband.”177
The Florence Court should not have accepted the conjecture of prison officials
who presumed, without adequate evidence, that blanket strip searching would
increase prison security. Instead, the Court should have relied on studies and
statistics as it did to demonstrate the efficacy of the cheek swab in King.

171. Id. at 1529 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
172. Id. at 1529-30 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-3-405(1) (2012);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 901.211(2) (West 2001); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/103-1(c) (West 2006);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 804.30 (West 2003); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-2521(a) (2007); MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 764.25a(2) (West 2000); MO. ANN. STAT. § 544.193.2 (West 2002); WAS. REV.
CODE ANN. § 10.79.130(1) (West 2010); 501 KY. ADMIN. REGS. 120 (2014)).
173. See supra note 155 (discussing circuit courts of appeals opinions that applied the Fourth
Amendment balancing test to evaluate the constitutionality of strip searches in prisons).
174. WILLIAM C. COLLINS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, JAILS AND THE CONSTITUTION 28–29 (2d
ed. 2007), available at https://s3.amazonaws.com/static.nicic.gov/Library/022570.pdf (noting that
jail officials tended to exaggerate the security threat). Ultimately, jail administrators’ assumptions
that suspicionless strip searches would reduce contraband were unfounded; as a former jail
administrator explained: “We really have not seen an increase in the entry of contraband in those
facilities that use a constitutionally valid strip search policy.” Don Leach, Arrestee Strip Searches:
An Administrator’s View, CORRECTIONAL L. REP., June-July 2010, at 13, 13.
175. See Dodge v. Cnty. of Orange, 282 F. Supp. 2d 41, 70 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
176. See Respondent’s Brief in Opposition at 7–8, Nassau Cnty. v. Shain, 537 U.S. 1083 (2002)
(No. 02-541).
177. Young v. Cnty. of Cook, 616 F. Supp. 2d 834, 847 (N.D. Ill. 2009).
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3. Least Intrusive Means
Neither the King Court nor the Florence Court discussed whether the
government used the least intrusive search means. Had the Court conducted this
analysis in King, it would have determined that a buccal swab was a less
intrusive means of collecting DNA than other available methods. Other reliable
methods of obtaining DNA include blood testing, semen samples, or the surgical
removal of tissue.178 Swabbing a Q-tip in the arrestee’s mouth is less intrusive
than any of these alternatives.
Had the Court considered less intrusive means in Florence, it would have
found that alternative means exist to search for contraband, address health risks,
and identify gang membership. First, a pat-down search will uncover the vast
majority of contraband and is “the least intrusive type of search [that] may be
conducted on a routine and random basis to maintain security and control.”179
Additionally, once an arrestee is detained, officials can conduct random
“shakedown” search of his cell to find any contraband smuggled into the
facility.180 Furthermore, in this technological age, a plethora of advanced
technological tools are available to search for contraband, such as metal
detectors.181 For example, the Body Orifice Scanning System—known as a
“BOSS chair”—is designed to detect metal objects concealed in body cavities.182
The Canon RadPro SecurPass, used in Illinois and Florida, is so accurate and
detailed it can display “something as minute as a filling in someone’s tooth.”183
Another justification for the strip search in Florence was the health of the
detainees; the search allowed the prison officials to screen arrestees for lice or
illness.184 However, these problems are a consequence of living in a correctional
facility,185 not of entering one. Moreover, only medical professionals are

178. See Rana Saad, Discovery, Development, and Current Applications of DNA Identity
Testing, 18 BAYLOR UNIV. MED. CTR. PROCEEDINGS 131, 132–33 (2005), available at
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1200713/pdf/bumc0018-0130.pdf.
179. MARK D. MARTIN & THOMAS A. ROSAZZA, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, RESOURCE GUIDE
FOR JAIL ADMINISTRATORS 113 (2004), available at http://static.nicic.gov/Library/020030.pdf.
180. See Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 589, 591 (1984) (upholding random “shakedown”
searches of detainees’ cells for contraband while they are away from them).
181. Brief of Former Attorneys General of New Jersey Robert J. Del Tufo et al. as Amici
Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 21, Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 132 S. Ct. 1510 (2012)
(No. 10-945) [hereinafter Brief of Former Attorneys General] (citing Kelsey v. City of Schoharie,
567 F.3d 54, 70 (2d Cir. 2009) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting)) (“[M]etal detectors may provide a less
intrusive means of identifying contraband.”).
182. Florence, 132 S. Ct. at 1528 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
183. Elaine Pittman, County Jails Deploy Whole-Body Scanners to Detect Hidden Weapons or
Contraband, GOV’T TECH (Apr. 27, 2011), http://www.govtech.com/public-safety/County-JailsDeploy-Whole-Body-Scanners.html (explaining that the scanning system takes only seven seconds,
compared to a fifteen-minute strip search).
184. Florence, 132 S. Ct. at 1518.
185. See Grant E. Deger & David W. Quick, The Enduring Menace of MRSA: Incidence,
Treatment, and Prevention in a County Jail, 15 J. CORRECTIONAL HEALTH CARE 174, 177 (2009)
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qualified to evaluate an arrestee’s medical condition.186 Jails require medical
examinations after intake, so an earlier strip search to evaluate the detainee’s
health is redundant and unnecessary.187
The Florence Court also relied on the need to identify gang members to justify
the strip search.188 However, male gang members do not tattoo their genitals or
body cavities, and women members, who may tattoo private areas, choose
tattoos representing sexual relationships, not gang affiliation.189 Instead, gang
members display their tattoos prominently as a form of communication to
identify their affiliation with a certain gang.190 Thus, the best method for
searching for gang tattoos would not be to strip search an individual, but to
examine already exposed body parts such as the face, hands, neck, arms, and
legs.
B. Individual’s Privacy Interest
The King Court explicitly addressed the privacy interest of the serious
offender who had his cheek swabbed for DNA evidence. However, it did not
discuss the privacy interest of the minor offender in Florence, who was forced
to strip, bend over, and have his body cavities inspected.
1. Legitimate Expectation of Privacy
Both King and Florence were pretrial detainees who had not yet appeared
before a neutral magistrate. Despite the similarities in their cases, the Court
treated King and Florence differently. In King, the Court correctly noted that
not every search is acceptable simply because a person is in custody.191
Additionally, once a person has been arrested for a dangerous offense that may
require pretrial detention, “his expectations of privacy and freedom from police
scrutiny are reduced.”192 Therefore, King had a reduced expectation of privacy
after being arrested for a serious offense. However, the Court refused to
recognize that Florence retained a much greater expectation of privacy because
he was only arrested for failing to pay a fine. Instead, the Court incorrectly

(noting that methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) is prevalent in jails because of
overcrowding, poor health care, and other factors); see also Brief Amici Curiae of Medical Society
of New Jersey the Center for Prisoner Health and Human Rights, and Medical Experts in Support
of Petitioner at 5, Florence, 132 S. Ct. 1510 (No. 10-945) (explaining that skin infections, such as
MRSA, are widespread in prisons but that strip searches are not effective at detecting them).
186. Reply Brief for the Petitioner at 15, Florence, 132 S. Ct. 1510 (No. 10-945).
187. See id.
188. Florence, 132 S. Ct. at 1518–19.
189. See Brief of Academics on Gang Behavior as Amici Curiae on Behalf of Petitioner at 6,
Florence, 132 S. Ct. 1510 (No. 10-945); see also Shawn Booth, Gang Symbols, in ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF GANGS 74, 75 (Louis Kontos & David C. Brotherton eds., 2008).
190. Brief of Academics on Gang Behavior, supra note 189, at 9.
191. Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1979 (2013).
192. Id. at 1978.
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treated Florence like a prisoner with a significantly reduced expectation of
privacy, despite his minor offender status. By placing the search within the
discretion of prison officials, the Court transformed the search from an
administrative booking procedure to a special needs prison regulation procedure.
This reduced Florence’s expectation of privacy from that of a minor offender,
who was unlikely to serve any jail time, to a prisoner at the mercy of unfettered
law enforcement discretion.
Because neither King nor Florence appeared before a magistrate before being
searched, the police were free to detain King for a serious offense and to place
Florence in the general prison population. However, the Court should have
required an official finding of probable cause before allowing the police to
conduct either search.193 By requiring a probable cause hearing, Florence would
have been released because he was suspected of an offense that does not carry
jail time. In King’s case, the police would have been required to show that there
was probable cause that King had committed first-degree assault before
swabbing his cheek.
2. Intrusiveness of the Search
Only King addressed the invasiveness of the search at issue, concluding that
the buccal swab procedure was not intrusive and likening the swab to DNA
fingerprinting. Conversely, the Florence Court refused to even label the search
a “strip search.” However, the labeling of the searches is less important than
where each falls on the intrusiveness scale. A cheek swab, although an intrusion
into the body, is not degrading, humiliating, or even very invasive. It takes no
more than a few seconds and only exposes the cheek, a single body part that is
typically visible when talking, eating, singing, or yawning. Therefore, the Court
was correct to conclude that the cheek swab was minimally invasive.
On the other hand, the Florence Court failed to place the search in question
on the invasiveness spectrum and refused to label the search a “strip search”
because no touching occurred.194 However, strip searches do not require
touching to be labeled as strip searches. For example, in Safford United School
District No. 1 v. Redding, the Court described a search of a student’s clothes as
a “strip search” even though she remained in her bra and underwear and no

193. Lower courts have required a probable cause hearing before allowing law enforcement to
take a DNA sample. See, e.g., Mario v. Kaipio, 265 P.3d 389, 392 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2011), vacated,
281 P.2d 476 (Ariz. 2012), abrogated by King, 133 S. Ct. 1958. This hearing is not held to
determine probable cause for a warrant, but rather is held to determine if there is probable cause to
detain the arrestee, based on the charges filed against him. See id. In King, the DNA collection
statute prohibited the police from testing King’s DNA sample until after his first appearance in
court. See MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 2-504(d)(1) (LexisNexis 2011 & Supp. 2013).
However, the police were permitted to take the swab before King’s initial court appearance. See
id. at § 2-504(a)(3)(i).
194. See Florence, 132 S. Ct. at 1513–15 (describing the search instead as “a close visual
inspection while undressed”).

2014]

Fourth Amendment's "Cheeks" and Balances

577

touching was involved.195 In addition, several states have defined the term “strip
search” to include visual inspections without touching.196 In his Florence
dissent, Justice Breyer specifically labeled these searches as “strip searches” and
correctly found them to be serious invasions of privacy.197
Individuals have an intense cultural and personal sense of privacy in their
bodies.198 Indeed, “[i]n a civilized society, one’s anatomy is draped with
constitutional protections,”199 and forced undressing without consent in almost
any other context results in criminal charges.200 People forced to expose
themselves often “experience a severe and sometimes debilitating humiliation
and loss of self-esteem.”201 Individuals subjected to strip searches have
described them as humiliating and shameful, with both short term effects, such
as weeping on the floor, and long term effects, such as severe psychological
trauma.202 Detainees who are strip searched after being arrested for minor
offenses are even more traumatized because they are taken by surprise, which
“exacerbate[es] the terrifying quality of the event.”203 Accordingly, the Court

195. 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2638 (2009) (noting that the student was forced to pull her underwear
away from her body and shake it out).
196. See, e.g., CAL. EDUC. CODE § 49050 (West 2006) (permitting specifically visual
inspection of underclothing, breast, buttocks, or genitalia); COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-3-405 (2012 &
Supp.) (defining a strip search as the removal of some or all clothing so as to allow a visual
inspection); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 948.50(2)(b) (West 2005 & Supp. 2012) (defining a strip search to
includes both exposure or touching of the genitals or pubic areas).
197. Florence, 132 S. Ct. at 1525 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
198. See Trina J. Magi, Fourteen Reasons Privacy Maters: A Multidisciplinary Review of
Scholarly Literature, 81 LIBR. Q. 187, 191–92 (2011) (noting that, according to the privacy norms
of various cultures, most prohibit nudity); Robert C. Post, Three Concepts of Privacy, 89 GEO. L.J.
2087, 2092–93 (2001) (explaining that ideas of privacy help to inform social norms that respect
individual dignity and autonomy); David C. James, Note, Constitutional Limitations on Body
Searches in Prisons, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1033, 1049–50 (1982) (“Nowhere are privacy and dignity
interests implicated more acutely than with respect to the body.”).
199. United States v. Afanador, 567 F.2d 1325, 1331 (5th Cir. 1978).
200. Brief for Psychiatrists as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 4, Florence, 132 S. Ct.
1510 (No. 10-945).
201. Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 537 (2006). For
example, the student searched in Safford was so humiliated that she transferred to a different high
school. Adam Liptak, Strip-Search of Young Girl Tests Limit of School Policy, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
24, 2009, at A19.
202. See Hunter v. Auger, 672 F.2d 668, 674 (8th Cir. 1982) (“[A] strip search, regardless how
professionally and courteously conducted, is an embarrassing and humiliating experience.”);
Lucero v. Donovan, 354 F.2d 16, 19 (9th Cir. 1965) (describing a search during which law
enforcement officials “made deprecating remarks” about the plaintiff’s body and the plaintiff wept
on the floor); see also McKeown, Strip Searches are Alive and Well in America, HUM. RTS., Spring
1985, 36, 37 (characterizing strip searches as “paralyzing”); Daphne Ha, Note, Blanket Policies for
Strip Searching Pretrial Detainees, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2721, 2740 (2011) (describing the
emotional and physical consequences of strip searching).
203. Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 12, at 23 (quoting Chapman v. Nichols, 989 F.2d 393,
396 (10th Cir. 1993)). For example, Florence was humiliated after being strip searched because he
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has recognized that forced disrobement is humiliating, degrading, and
dehumanizing.204 Consequently, the Florence Court should have recognized
that the search at issue was deeply invasive and therefore should have labeled it
a strip search.
In addition to the minimal invasiveness of the cheek swab itself, the King
Court also noted the statutory limitations on the use of the DNA sample; DNA
may only be tested for identification, not to reveal genetic traits.205 However,
the Court should have been more explicit in defining the constitutional
implications of both potential searches. The first search, the buccal swab of
King’s cheek, was minimally invasive because King simply had to open his
mouth for a few seconds for a Q-tip swab. However, had the police used the
DNA evidence beyond identifying King by, for example, testing for other
genetic traits, they would have conducted a much more intrusive search.206 In
that situation, King would have done more than simply open his mouth; he
would have exposed personal genetic information that he is entitled to keep
private. Although the Court based its argument, in part, on the fact that the use
of the DNA sample was limited to identification, it did not clearly distinguish
the two searches for constitutional purposes.
V. THE RESULTING EFFECTS, ABUSES, AND PROPOSED REMEDIES
The consequence of King and Florence is that all citizens should be concerned
about their Fourth Amendment rights. Law enforcement officials now have the
ability to strip search you, visually inspect your body cavities, and swab your
cheek for DNA, even if they have no suspicion that these searches will uncover
evidence or contraband. The Founding Fathers sought to prohibit exactly this
sort of unfettered discretion and its potential for abuse with the Fourth
Amendment.

“had ‘never been . . . seen naked in front of a man’ other than his father.” Id. When the officer
conducting the search looked at him, Florence “just wanted to get away from [the officer] as quickly
as [he] could.” Id.
204. Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 374–75 (2009). The Court
also noted that some communities find strip searches to be so degrading that they have forbidden
them. Id. at 375.
205. Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1967 (2013) (explaining that the Maryland statute
only permits police officers to test noncoding parts of DNA, which do not reveal any of the
arrestee’s genetic traits).
206. Other courts have distinguished these two searches. See, e.g., Friedman v. Boucher, 580
F.3d 847, 858 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that the search was unconstitutional because the DNA was
collected from the defendant for the purpose of adding to a law enforcement databank); United
States v. Kriesel, 508 F.3d 941, 947–48 (9th Cir. 2007) (“The concerns about DNA samples being
used beyond identification purposes are real and legitimate.”); United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d
813, 837–38 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (plurality opinion) (acknowledging the constitutional
distinction between DNA testing for identity and DNA testing for genetic information).
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A. The Resulting Effects and Abuses
The decisions in King and Florence have several important consequences: (1)
the traumatic and disproportionate effects of suspicionless searches of arrestees
charged with minor offenses; (2) the potential for abuse of the expansive
holdings, which do not require a probable cause hearing before the searches may
be performed; (3) the unnecessary entry of minor offenders into the general jail
population; and (4) the inappropriate use of DNA testing, especially with
expanding new technologies.
1. Effects of Suspicionless Searches of Minor Offenders
The suspicionless strip search and visual body cavity inspection of Florence
was not an isolated incident. These types of searches occur more often than one
may believe because police have the ability to arrest and detain individuals for
minor offenses such as moving, parking, and bicycle violations.207
Occasionally, police also strip search these individuals. For example, police
have strip searched a nun for trespassing during an anti-war protest,208 a woman
for speeding,209 a group of teachers for disorderly conduct during a strike,210 and
other individuals who committed minor, non-violent crimes.211
Blanket strip search policies desensitize law enforcement officers to the
dehumanizing and traumatic effects of the searches and cause officers to view
detainees as “booking-numbered objects to be processed.”212 In addition, the
most inexperienced officers are often assigned to perform strip searches,
creating the potential for mistake or abuse, especially with searches of women
and children.213
Women are especially susceptible to pretextual arrests as a vehicle for strip
searches. Women are generally subjected to more invasive searches than men

207. See Brief for the Petitioner, supra note at 12, at 25.
208. See Bull v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 595 F.3d 964, 989 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (Thomas,
J., dissenting).
209. See Tinetti v. Wittke, 479 F. Supp. 486, 488 (E.D. Wis. 1979), aff’d, 620 F.2d 160 (7th
Cir. 1980).
210. Paul R. Shuldiner, Visual Rape: A Look at the Dubious Legality of Strip Searches, 13 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 273, 274 (1980).
211. See, e.g., Chapman v. Nichols, 989 F.3d 393, 394 (10th Cir. 1993) (presenting a strip
search resulting from driving with a suspended license); Masters v. Crouch, 872 F.2d 1248, 1250
(6th Cir. 1989) (recounting a strip search resulting from a failure to appear in traffic court, even
though the judge provided wrong date); Jones v. Edwards, 770 F.2d 739, 740 (8th Cir. 1985)
(considering a strip search resulting from violating a leash law); Doe v. Calument City, 754 F.
Supp. 1211, 1213–14 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (analyzing a strip search resulting from a young woman’s
underage drinking).
212. Bull, 595 F.3d at 1000 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
213. See Brief of Current and Former Jail and Corrections Professionals as Amici Curiae in
Support of Petitioner at 15, Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 132 S. Ct. 1510 (2012) (No.
10-945) [hereinafter Brief of Current and Former Jail and Corrections Professionals].
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because, according to law enforcement and correctional officials, vaginal
smuggling is easier and therefore more prevalent than anal smuggling.214 These
searches can be particularly traumatic for women who have been victims of
domestic abuse or sexual assaults,215 which is problematic because women are
physically and sexually abused at a higher rate than men. Indeed, more than
fifty percent of detained women report that they have been victims of physical
or sexual abuse.216
Children also experience trauma as a result of strip searches at a higher rate
than others.217 Students who are strip searched typically have problems
concentrating in school, drop out of school at higher rates than other students,
and experience difficulties with personal relationships.218 These students may
also suffer from anxiety, phobias, depression, and occasionally even suicidal
behavior.219 Strip searches can be as traumatic as rape or sexual abuse to
adolescents, whose self-conscious body images are directly related to their selfesteem and well being.220
Strip and visual cavity searches of individuals arrested for minor offenses also
stifle constitutional rights. For example, a protestor may think twice before

214. See Margo Schlanger, Jail Strip-Search Cases: Patterns and Participants, 71 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 65, 75 (2008).
One commentator has described strip searches as “visual rape.” Shuldiner, supra note 211, at 303.
215. See Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 12, at 24; ANTI-DISCRIMINATION COMM’N
QUEENSLAND,
WOMEN
IN
PRISON
72
(2006),
available
at
https://www.adcq.qld.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0018/5148/WIP_report.pdf; see also RUSSEL
P. DOBASH ET AL., THE IMPRISONMENT OF WOMEN 204–05 (1986); Lori B. Girshick, Abused
Women and Incarceration, in WOMEN IN PRISON 95–96 (Barbara H. Zaitzow & Jim Thomas eds.
2003); Jan Heney & Connie M. Kristiansen, An Analysis of the Impact of Prison on Women
Survivors of Childhood Sexual Abuse, in BREAKING THE RULES: WOMEN IN PRISON AND FEMINIST
THERAPY 29, 30–31 (Judy Harden & Marcia Hill eds., 1998); Jude McCulloch & Amanda George,
Naked Poker: Strip Searching in Women’s Prisons, in THE VIOLENCE OF INCARCERATION 107,
116 (Phil Scraton & Jude McCulloch eds., 2009); Louise Bill, The Victimization and
Revictimization of Female Offenders: Prison Administrators Should Be Aware of Ways in Which
Security Procedures Perpetuate Feelings of Powerlessness Among Incarcerated Women,
CORRECTIONS TODAY, Dec. 1998, at 106, 108–10.
216. Brief of Former Attorneys General, supra note 181, at 30 (citing DORIS J. JAMES, U.S.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS SPECIAL REPORT 10 (2004), available at
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/pji02.pdf).
217. See Laura L. Finley, Examining School Searches as Systemic Violence, 14 CRITICAL
CRIMINOLOGY 117, 125–26 (2006).
218. See Irwin A. Human & Donna C. Perone, The Other Side of School Violence: Educator
Policies and Practices that May Contribute to Student Misbehavior, 36 J. SCH. PSYCHOL. 7, 13
(1998); Stephen F. Shatz et al., The Strip Search of Children and the Fourth Amendment, 26 U.S.F.
L. REV. 1, 13–14 (1991). Courts have taken the same view that “[c]hildren are especially
susceptible to trauma from strip searches.” See, e.g., Flores v. Meese, 681 F. Supp. 665, 667 (C.D.
Cal. 1988), rev’d sub nom. Renov v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292 (1993).
219. See Shatz, et al., supra note 218, at 12.
220. See David C. Blickenstaff, Strip Searches of Public School Students: Can New Jersey v.
T.L.O. Solve the Problem?, 99 DICK. L. REV. 1, 45 (1994).
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asserting his First Amendment rights if his arrest for a minor offense could result
in an invasive strip search.221
Many law and policy makers understand the traumatic effects of strip
searching and have spoken out against suspicionless searches of individuals
arrested for minor offenses. For example, former Governor of New Jersey Tom
Kean stated: “It is an outrageous abuse of authority to subject a person detained
for a motor vehicle violation, for instance, to a strip search . . . . [I]t is a violation
of a person’s privacy and dignity and cannot be tolerated or condoned.”222
Similarly, the American Bar Association’s Standards for Criminal Justice
provide that “a strip search should not be permitted without individualized
reasonable suspicion when the prisoner is an arrestee charged with a minor
offense not involving drugs or violence.”223 Additionally, federal agencies such
as the Bureau of Prisons, the Immigration and Customs Service, the Bureau of
Indian Affairs, and the United States Marshals Service forbid strip searches
unless the officers have a reasonable suspicion that the arrestee is concealing
contraband on his person.224
2. Potential Abuse as the Result of a Search Conducted Without a Probable
Cause Hearing
Law enforcement officials are responsible for determining what offense will
predicate an arrest and whether the arrestee will be housed in the general prison
population. Therefore, unless a neutral magistrate intervenes, the determination
of which detainees to search, either through a cheek swab or visual cavity search,
is left to the police. The Court’s ruling in King allows police to arrest a person
for a serious crime as a pretext to acquire DNA material to enter into a database
for criminal record identification. Police could therefore charge a serious
offense alongside a minor offense as a pretext to authorize a DNA swab. For
example, King was originally charged with first-degree assault and seconddegree assault, but the first-degree assault—the charge that permitted the cheek
swab—was subsequently dropped.225 Moreover, after Florence, police may
arrest a citizen for any reason, decide to intermingle him with the general
population of a prison, and force him to strip and expose his genitals and anal
cavity. Without a magistrate to intervene before the decision to intermingle is
made, all citizens are at risk for strip and visual body cavity searches.

221. See Schalnger, supra note 214, at 67 (describing the case of Judith Haney, who was
arrested at a 2003 political demonstration in Miami, Florida and forced to bend over, expose her
anus and genitals, squat, and then “hop like a bunny”).
222. Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 12, at 17.
223. AM. BAR ASS’N., ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: TREATMENT OF PRISONERS
§ 23-7.9(d)(ii) (3d ed. 2011).
224. Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 132 S. Ct. 1510, 1529 (2012) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
225. Brief for the Respondent, supra note 7, at 43.
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3. Intermingling of Minor Offenders in the General Jail Population
Together, Florence and Atwater give police the authority to decide who will
undergo a strip search.226 However, in their Florence concurrences, Chief
Justice Roberts and Justice Alito both expressed concern about the potential to
abuse Florence’s broad holding. Justice Alito admitted that most individuals
arrested for minor offenses are not typically dangerous and, consequently, that
strip searching these offenders is particularly humiliating.227 Justice Alito also
cautioned that admitting minor offenders into the general jail population may be
unreasonable if alternative detention options are available.228 Chief Justice
Roberts clarified that, in Florence’s specific case, there was no alternative to
holding him the in general jail population.229 In fact, alternative facilities are
often not an option, especially in small communities that can only afford one
general holding facility.230
4. Inappropriate Use of DNA Testing
The King majority failed to draw the important distinction between DNA
searches. First, the cheek swab itself was a search for Fourth Amendment
purposes. However, the subsequent testing of that sample, for a purpose other
than identification, is a discrete, more invasive search. This distinction is
important. For example, if a suspect is questioned at the police station, he may
inadvertently leave hair or skin cells behind. According to King, police are
permitted to test these samples to identify the suspect. Such a search is
permissible because the suspect has technically abandoned the skin cells, and he
therefore has no expectation of privacy in them. Any additional testing of the
sample is unconstitutional because the suspect has a legitimate expectation of
privacy in the genetic information gathered from additional tests.231
Additionally, law enforcement and courts will struggle in applying this vague
jurisprudence to new technology. For example, facial-recognition technology
and other biometric tools, which can identify variations in an individual’s irises,

226. See Florence, 132 S. Ct. at 1513, 1523 (permitting strip searches of any arrestee who will
enter the general prison population); Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354 (2001)
(recognizing law enforcement’s discretion to determine who may be arrested).
227. Florence, 132 S. Ct. at 1524 (Alito, J., concurring).
228. Id. (Alito, J., concurring).
229. Id. at 1523 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
230. Id. at 1524 (Alito, J., concurring).
231. See Raynor v. State, 29 A.3d 617, 621, 625 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2011) (holding that
defendant’s skin cells, left on arm rest when he repeatedly rubbed his hands on chair in police
station, were abandoned and could therefore be used for identification purposes only), cert. granted,
52 A.3d 978 (Md. 2012); Williamson v. State, 993 A.2d 626, 635, 642 (Md. 2010) (finding that
DNA left on a cup used at police station was abandoned and therefore did not violate Fourth
Amendment).
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vein patterns, walking gait, and skin textures, are now available.232 This
technology could be compared to photographs and therefore may not even
implicate the Fourth Amendment. Advanced identification technology could
also be compared to collection and testing DNA for genetic material and
therefore extremely intrusive. Because King failed to address most of these
technology questions, future courts will need to consider these technologies
without the benefit of Supreme Court jurisprudence.
B. Proposed Remedies
To balance the problematic rules set forth in King and Florence, states and
agencies can employ their own safeguards to protect individual Fourth
Amendment rights. States could (1) limit strip searches to arrestees about whom
law enforcement has reasonable suspicion; (2) require a ruling on probable cause
before officers are permitted to conduct a cheek swab and strip searches occur;
(3) limit the placement of detainees arrested for minor offenses into the general
jail population; and (4) explicitly limit the purpose of DNA testing to only
identification.
1. Requirement of Reasonable Suspicion
State courts and legislatures can help to prevent potential abuse of Florence
by requiring reasonable suspicion that detainees are carrying contraband before
they may be strip searched and inspected. Reasonable suspicion should be
based, in part, on the seriousness or violence of the crime for which the
individual was arrested. At least eighteen state legislatures have already enacted
statutes that prohibit suspicionless strip searches of individuals arrested for
minor offenses.233

232. Craig Timberg & Ellen Nakashima, Photo-ID Databases Become Troves for Police,
WASH. POST, June 17, 2013, at A1.
233. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 4030(f) (West 2011) (requiring reasonable suspicion); COLO.
REV. STAT. § 16-3-405(1) (2012) (requiring reasonable belief); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 5433L(a) (West 2009) (requiring reasonable belief); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 901.211(2) (West 2001)
(requiring probable cause); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/103-1(c) (West 2006) (requiring
reasonable belief); IOWA CODE ANN. 804.30 (West 2003) (requiring probable cause); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 22-2521(a)(2007) (requiring probable cause); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 764.25a(2)
(West 2000) (requiring reasonable cause); MO. ANN. STAT. § 544.193.2 (West 2002) (requiring
probable cause); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A.161A-1(b) (West 2011) (requiring probable cause); OHIO
REV. CODE. ANN. § 2933.32(B)(2) (LexisNexis 2010) (requiring probable cause); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 40-7-119(b) (2012) (requiring reasonable belief); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-59.1(A) (2008)
(requiring reasonable cause); WAS. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.79.130(1) (West 2012) (requiring
reasonable suspicion or probable cause); 501 KY. ADMIN. REGS. 119 (2014) (requiring reasonable
suspicion); 03-201 ME. CODE R. § II(1)(B) (2006) (requiring reasonable suspicion); 81 NEB.
ADMIN. CODE § 006.03A2, .03D4 (1987) (requiring reasonable suspicion or probable cause); VT.
AGENCY OF HUMAN SERVS., DEP’T OF CORRECTIONS, Directive 315.01, § II.A.2. (1997) (requiring
reasonable suspicion).
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Law enforcement agencies can easily implement these stricter policies. The
United States Marshals Service, the Immigration and Customs Service, and the
Bureau of Indian Affairs all apply a reasonable suspicion standard before strip
searching detainees who will be held in the general jail population.234
Additionally, the American Correctional Association, which sets nationwide
standards for correctional facilities, requires reasonable suspicion before an
arrestee may be strip searched at intake.235 Similarly, the Department of
Justice’s National Institute of Corrections has published a comprehensive
handbook for jail administrators, which requires reasonable suspicion for strip
searches, limits the type of offenses for which strip searches may be performed,
and prohibits blanket strip search policies.236
The reasonable suspicion standard encourages officers to apply their training
and experience to assess whether a strip search is necessary. Many jurisdictions
have implemented checklists to assist officers in determining whether
reasonable suspicion exists.237 Jail personnel are encouraged to consider a range
of factors, such as: “(1) the crime charged, (2) the particular characteristics of
the arrestee . . . (3) the circumstances of the arrest,”238 (4) the arrestee’s criminal
record, (5) the effect of placing the detainee in the general prison population,
and (6) the safety concerns raised by the detainee.239 Other jurisdictions should
implement similar guidelines.
Finally, the reasonable suspicion standard will not cause an increase in
contraband in prisons, as evidence by the data reported by jurisdictions that have
already implemented this standard.240 Pat down searches, advanced metal
detectors, and random searches of cells are sufficient to ensure safe prisons.241
In fact, requiring reasonable suspicion will allow correctional officers to focus
their limited resources on offenders who are likely to have concealed
contraband.

234. Florence, 132 S. Ct. at 1529 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
235. AM. CORR. ASS’N, CORE JAIL STANDARDS Standard 1- CORE-2C-02 (2010); AM. CORR.
ASS’N, PERFORMANCE-BASED STANDARDS FOR ADULT LOCAL DETENTION FACILITIES Standard
4-ALDF-2C-03 (4th ed. 2004); Standards and Accreditation, AM. CORRECTIONAL ASS’N,
https://www.aca.org/standards/faq.asp (last visited Apr. 10, 2014).
236. Florence, 132 S. Ct. at 1529 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing MARTIN & ROSAZZA, supra
note 189, at 4).
237. Brief of Current and Former Jail and Corrections Professionals, supra note 213, at 17–18
(discussing a checklist provided to new sheriffs in Indiana).
238. Weber v. Dell, 804 F.2d 796, 802 (2d Cir. 1986) (listing factors to consider in determining
whether reasonable suspicion exists for a minor crime).
239. See Gabriel M. Helmer, Note, Strip Searches and the Felony Detainee: A Case for
Reasonable Suspicion, 81 B.U. L. REV. 239, 283 (2001).
240. See supra notes 155, 174–77 and accompanying text.
241. See Brief of Former Attorneys General, supra note 181, at 20–21.
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2. Requirement of Probable Cause Hearings Before the Search
Before allowing police to take a DNA sample or to strip search, states should
require a hearing to determine if the pending charges are supported by probable
cause. This requirement would deter police from charging a person with a
serious crime for the sole purpose of collecting his DNA. Requiring a probable
cause hearing would help to ensure that police do not target specific citizens and
arrest them for a minor offense as a pretext to strip search them.
Finally, a finding of probable cause before the search would prevent the
humiliation detainees experience from undergoing invasive searches based on
invalid charges. For example, after being arrested, Florence should have
promptly appeared before a judge, who could have quashed the warrant and
released him or set appropriate bond.
3. Limit the Offenders Who May be Placed in the General Prison
Population
Although the Florence Court limited strip searches to only those arrestees
detained in the general prison population, it placed no limitations on who may
be placed in the general population.242 Currently, a wide range of minor
violations, such as failure to wear a seatbelt,243 failure to stop at a stop sign,244
and improperly using a car horn245 can result in arrest and detention. States have
the authority to arrest and detain even those individuals accused of minor
offenses that do not impose jail time as part of its penalty.246 States should
therefore impose their own limits on the types of detainees who can be
intermingled in the general jail population. There are a number of available
means by which this can be accomplished. First, state legislatures could forbid
warrantless arrests for minor offenses to ensure that these offenders are never
detained.247 Instead, the police officer could simply write a citation.
Second, jails can classify and separate detainees based on offense and criminal
background. Indeed, many correctional systems already classify detainees based
on objective factors such as the severity of their alleged offense.248 In fact, New
Jersey, the state in which Florence was arrested, authorizes offenders to be
detained based on offense, previous incarceration, behavior, addiction, and
status as a detainee or sentenced prisoner, among other factors.249 Such

242. Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 132 S. Ct. 1518, 1520–23 (Alito, J., concurring).
243. See Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354 (2001).
244. See Revely v. City of Huntington, No. 3:07-0648, 2009 WL 1097972, at *1–2 (S.D. W.
Va. Apr. 23, 2009), aff’d, 379 F. App’x 297 (4th Cir. 2010) (per curiam).
245. See Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188, 1190, 1195–96 (11th Cir. 2002).
246. Atwater, 532 U.S. at 323, 359 (permitting the custodial arrest of a woman for failing to
wear seat belt, even though the offense did not carry any jail time).
247. See id. at 352.
248. See Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 12, at App. 53a.
249. N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 10A:31-22.2(a) (2013).
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classification systems allow jails to focus resources on the riskiest inmates,
which improves both safety and jail administration.250 In many cases, arrestees
are temporarily detained but never processed into the general jail population,251
as it is illogical and economically inefficient to introduce the arrestee into the
general jail population before he is released.
Third, some states may require that detainees charged with minor offenses be
housed separately from those detained in the general population. For example,
the Federal Bureau of Prisons separates minor offenders who will only be
temporarily detained from the general population of the facility.252 Similarly,
the San Francisco County Jail System distinguishes between arrestees eligible
for release, who are kept in a temporary intake and release facility, and those
who are not eligible for release and detained in the general jail population.253
Although it may be difficult for some smaller jurisdictions to achieve, states
should attempt to house minor offenders separately if it is economically feasible
to do so.
4. Limit the Purpose of DNA Testing
To remedy the King Court’s failure to identify the two discrete searches
stemming from the collection of King’s DNA, states can specifically limit the
testing of DNA material solely for the purpose of identification. The statute at
issue in King imposed this limitation.254 Other states should limit their own
DNA collection statutes accordingly. Statutes permitting this type of DNA
testing should only allow testing for identification, not for any other genetic
markers. In situations in which law enforcement wishes to use the DNA sample
for purposes beyond identification, the State must recognize additional testing
as a second, more intrusive search that requires both probable cause and a
warrant before it can be performed. As new Fourth Amendment questions arise
as a consequence of constantly improving technology, courts must balance the
government’s interest and the individuals’ privacy concerns in order to ensure
that DNA evidence is collected and tested in a constitutionally reasonable
manner.

250. See JAMES AUSTIN, NAT’L INST. OF CORRS., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OBJECTIVE JAIL
CLASSIFICATION SYSTEMS 8 (Feb. 1998), available at http://www.nicic.gov/Library
/Files/014373.pdf) (advising that objective classification systems have several benefits, including
“[i]mproved security and control of inmates by identifying and providing appropriate surveillance
for each group by assisting the corrections staff in knowing what ‘kind’ of inmates are where”).
251. Brief for Amicus Curiae National Police Accountability Project in Support of Petitioner
at 12, Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 132 S. Ct. 1510 (2012) (No. 10-945).
252. See Florence, 132 S. Ct. at 1524. (Alito, J., concurring).
253. See Bull v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 595 F.3d 964, 968 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc).
254. MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAF. § 2-505(b)(1) (LexisNexis 2011) (“[O]nly DNA records that
directly relate to the identification of individuals shall be collected and stored.”).
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VI. CONCLUSION
As a result of the Supreme Court’s decisions in King and Florence, if you are
arrested today for a minor offense, such as a traffic violation, the police may be
permitted to force you to strip, bend over, and cough and to inspect your anus
and genitals, but they may not swab the inside of your cheek for a DNA sample.
This absurd predicament is the result of the Court’s inconsistent application of
the Fourth Amendment.
The Fourth Amendment exists “to protect personal privacy and dignity against
unwarranted intrusion by the State.”255 The Supreme Court is responsible for
administering this protection; law enforcement officials are not in the position
to balance individuals’ rights against their own interest in prison safety.
However, the Court abdicated this responsibility in both cases.
In King, the Court deferred to law enforcement in determining who would be
arrested for a serious offense, holding that DNA could be collected only from
individuals arrested for serious offenses and before any initial evaluation of
probable cause. In Florence, the Court confused deference with abdication and
permitted law enforcement officials to strip search all detainees who will be held
in the general jail population, even those arrested for crimes that do not impose
incarceration as a penalty. The Court accepted the prison officials’ assertion that
strip searches are necessary to protect the general jail population.
As the Court noted in King, “urgent government interests are not a license for
indiscriminate police behavior.”256 Yet, these two cases permit indiscriminate
police behavior. Although the Court correctly ruled in King that the cheek swab
was permissible because the government’s interest in identifying the detainee
outweighs the minimal intrusiveness of the search, the Court should have
permitted the search only after a neutral magistrate found that probable cause
existed to charge King with a serious crime. The Court should also have clearly
distinguished the use of the DNA sample for identification purposes from its use
to uncover genetic markers so that DNA evidence is not misused in the future.
Additionally, the Court should have concluded that the strip and visual cavity
search in Florence was unconstitutional and should only permit strip searches if
reasonable suspicion exists that the detainee is carrying contraband. Like in
King, the search of Florence should not have been conducted until a neutral
magistrate determined that probable cause existed to detain him in the general
jail population.
As a result, law enforcement officials now have the ability to conduct intrusive
searches merely in the hope that they will discover contraband. This unfettered
discretion is what has been described as the “hallmark of a police state”257 and

255. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966).
256. Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1970 (2013).
257. United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 550 (1985) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
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eliminates the checks and balances required by the Constitution. Until states and
agencies provide more individual protections to remedy the problems and abuses
resulting from these decisions, citizens should recognize that, if they are
arrested, they run the risk of having both of their cheeks inspected.

